No
rate design is able to perfectly fulfill all of the intended roles. Rather,
each rate design must be judged on how it balances
all of the conflicting objectives and not just on how well it achieves any
single objective. - Kenneth Gordon, Jeff D. Makholm, Retail Cost Recovery and Rate Design in a Restructured
Environment , NERA Economic Consulting
While it is true that markets for electricity are more susceptible to manipulation than markets for other products, the recent price hike of electricity apparently has nothing to do with abuse of market power or flaws in electricity market design but it is the result of poor planning and MERALCO’s immunity to automatic cost adjustment (ACA)/”pass-through” mechanism.
While it is true that markets for electricity are more susceptible to manipulation than markets for other products, the recent price hike of electricity apparently has nothing to do with abuse of market power or flaws in electricity market design but it is the result of poor planning and MERALCO’s immunity to automatic cost adjustment (ACA)/”pass-through” mechanism.
The
ACA/pass-through mechanism without safeguard, to borrow the words of Stephen Wallace, does not provide a very good regulatory approach as it creates a moral
hazard. The moral hazard arises because the purchaser does not have an incentive
to act prudently. That is, the purchaser does not take the full consequences
and responsibilities of the price it pays for a generator/supplier, and
therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it would otherwise.[1]
Facts:
1. The Malampaya gas field shutdown in November is not the first.
There were similar shutdowns in the past.
2. MERALCO and concern government agencies have known as early
as October the scheduled shutdown.
Questions:
1. Why
MERALCO did not seek comfort in the so-called option contract to limit its
exposure to spot market? It did enter into a short term bilateral contract but
only with Therma Mobile Inc. (TMO) owned by the Aboitiz group (ERC Case No.
2013-196 RC) for a maximum contracted capacity of 234 MW and an effective rate
of about PhP11/kWh. Under normal condition (i.e. base load power plants are
online), MERALCO’s typical exposure to the WESM is more than 500 MW. MERALCO
should have contracted with other peaking plants like the 225 MW Bauang
and 600MW Limay plants.
2. MERALCO
should also explain why it offered to WESM the PhP62/kWh price cap for the
energy generation of TMO (MERALCO President Oscar Reyes mentioned something
on the must-offer-rule during the hearing). Under its supply contract, MERALCO
decides on the bids of Therma Mobile in the WESM. Is this a blunder, greed or
insensitivity?
Funny thing is, Aboitiz
might have purchased its own TMO generation from WESM at five times the
generation price to cover contract commitments to MERALCO due to the force
outage of Pagbilao coal fired power plant during the same period.
3. Why
the PSALM-owned 650-megawatt Malaya
thermal power plant in Rizal wasn’t operating? In early 2010, the System Operator (SO) NGCP put
on almost continuous must run status the said plant during the maintenance
outage of the Malampaya gas field that also coincided with force outage of
several base load power plants.
The excuse of PSALM that it would
not be able to recover costs even if it will bid at PhP62.00/kWh is ridiculous
since the generating cost of a peaking plant like Malaya is less than
PhP15/kWh. We all know that a big gap in supply and demand is costly.
Bottom-line:
MERALCO is liable. MERALCO is not
just a “collecting agent” but it has the obligation to source its electricity
supply in the “least cost manner” as stated in Section 23 of the EPIRA.
MERALCO, with the help of ERC and the DOE, could have implemented emergency
measures to address the demand requirements which they did during similar shutdowns in the past. Sad
thing is the DOE and the ERC sort of tolerated MERALCO’s improper planning and
insensitivity.
The
last-minute fixes made by the tripartite committee to
reduce the cap to PhP32 from PhP62 per kWh after the senate hearing is a classic
example of regulatory uncertainty. This
is similar to the way ERC handled the
application for approval of the Ancillary Service Procurement Agreement (ASPA)
between the NGCP and Therma Marine, Inc. (TMI) during the congressional inquiry on
Mindanao power crisis.
Post Script:
The
disjointed questioning of senators during the initial hearing left three brilliant quips (not exactly the transcript, ito lang yung
mga natandaan ko):
Sen. Bam Aquino: Gaano katagal ang approval ng mga application para magtayo ng
planta?
DOE Usec: Mga 2-3 years
po. [I’m not sure about the period basta matagal plus idagdag mo pa yung ERC
rate application]
SBA: Yun na nga ang point ko, paano natin ma-encourage ang mga
investor pag ganyan katagal.
------
Sen. Allan Cayetano: Bakit cost-based pricing? Paano kung ang market price is
mas mababa?
[His reaction to ERC Commissioner Victoria Taruc’s
connotation that cost-based regulation is synonymous with ‘consumer protection’.]
-----
Sen. Trillanes: Huwag po nating sabihin na wala tayong magagawa! Marami po tayong magagawa!
[I guess this is his reaction to Petilla’sWhat can we do…? Don’t buy, kung namamahalan kayo!” and to the ERC’s “Mas lalo namang hindi maganda kung mag-brown out tayo”. Enough to cover his apparent lack of knowledge in electricity pricing.]
[1] GENERATION AND
CONTRACTS REFERENCE PRICING, p.11
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